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Anu Leinonen: Lähi-Itä nyt, in English, Middle East Now, is a podcast that helps you to understand what the Middle East is all about. The podcast is brought to you by the Finnish Institute in the Middle East, usually just FIME. I am Anu Leinonen, the executive of the Foundation of the Finnish Institute in the Middle East.

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Anu Leinonen: Our topic today is researching Kurds in Turkey, and I'm in Diyarbakir, Amed in Kurdish, in the studio of the media centre Botan International with Berfin Coşkun from the Kurdish Studies Center, also located here in Diyarbakir. Welcome to the podcast, Berfin.

Berfin Coşkun: Welcome. Hi.

Anu Leinonen: Botan International is a company working with Reporters Without Borders and providing journalists education in Kurdish as well as other services for journalists. We are happy to be here in their excellent studio. Berfin Coşkun has been working for the Kurdish Studies Center since last summer. She has made her master's thesis on intergenerational dynamics in Kurdish families and is also involved in the work of the Association of Young Peace Builders in Turkey. Thus, she is the perfect person to ask about research on Kurds in Turkey. It's so nice to be here with you, Berfin, today.

Berfin Coşkun: For me too, hosting you in Diyarbakir.

Anu Leinonen: Yes, we've been working in the same office for four weeks, but most of the time, we don't really have time to talk about research questions in length. So now, we have the chance for that.

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Anu Leinonen: But before we go into the business of the day, so, talking about producing knowledge and doing research on Kurds in Turkey, I have some personal questions to you about how you got into the field. You did your master thesis in the Ghent University in Belgium on intergenerational differences in Kurdish families. What made you interested in that topic?

Berfin Coşkun: Firstly, my own personal experience. I am also a Kurd from Diyarbakir and I'm a young Kurd woman from Diyarbakir. And I have some observation with my family, with my parents too. So, I have come to understand that we are experiencing our Kurdishness in daily life in very different ways. I think that's because the social, historical and cultural, political conditions that we are living in. So, that's why I think we have different understanding of Kurdishness. I wondered if it reflects on the general Kurdish society, so, I come up with that question.

Anu Leinonen: Okay. Why did you do it abroad? Would it be possible to do such a research here in Turkey or not?

Berfin Coşkun: Yeah, it is possible, but it would have been much worse and much harder than in abroad, because unfortunately, we don't have any freedom of speech, freedom of thought in neither academia nor in social life in general. So, I think researching Kurds, studying on Kurds, in any topic, it doesn't need to be something related to politics, when you want to do sociological or anthropological research, it's still very hard to study on Kurds in today's Turkish academia. I mean, I would rather to continue my academic production for the sake of the liberty and freedom on abroad in any way. Yeah.

Anu Leinonen: What were the main findings of your study on intergenerational dynamics in Kurdish families?

Berfin Coşkun: So, the exact research question of my research was how the perception and daily life practices of Kurdish ethnic identity differs intergenerationally. For this reason, I have interviewed with pairs of parents and a child. I have interviewed with eight pairs of parent and child in the Diyarbakir last April. So yeah, it was before the historic general election. So, everybody was already so willing to speak about their Kurdishness and political issues. And the main findings, I have gathered the main findings under two title. The first one is how they define being Kurd, what makes them Kurds. And it goes with three different dynamics. The first one is language. We are gonna delve into more during

our podcast, language, so, I'm keeping short here, but it's a very important component of being Kurd in Turkey. And the second dynamic is a collectivistic way of organizing society, and they call it Kurdish culture, the traditional Kurdish culture. It's more like collectivistically organized Kurdish society, it refers to that. And the third one is religion. We know that the secularization within the Kurdish community is going on faster than it is in Turkish community. But I think religion is still having a great impact on defining your Kurdishness. So yes, these are the three subtitles of the first title. And the other one is the intergenerational differences in confrontation with the Turkish community. So, it's very traumatic for the previous generation, for the elder generation, but now, since the Kurdish young people are more engaged with the Turkish community in Turkey, they have, I don't know, smooth, and some pure experience with the Turks. So, these are the main findings of my thesis.

Anu Leinonen: So that the younger generation feels closer to the Turkish society at large?

Berfin Coşkun: Yes, because mostly, they have similar experiences with the Turkish youngster than their Kurdish parents. So, yes, today's Kurdish youth is more engaged with the Turkish society in terms of having the same educational background, similar educational background, having the same problems in terms of economy, in terms of, I don't know, the injustices and the same political and social problems. So, they have a similar experience than their parents have in their youth with the Turkish community. Yeah, we can say that they are more engaged with the Turkish society at large.

Anu Leinonen: At the moment, you're working for the Kurdish Studies Center, but what do you plan to do in the future? Will you continue in the academia? If you do, will that be abroad or do you want to stay in Diyarbakir or somewhere else in Turkey?

Berfin Coşkun: Yeah, I mean, I wish I could live in Diyarbakir with the peace in academia at Dicle University, which is located in Diyarbakir. But yes, I have some future plans in academia. I'm currently also preparing some PhD proposals for the universities on abroad, especially in Europe. Because that's what I am used to, while doing my master degree. And also, I have experienced the liberty of talking about anything, in Belgium at Ghent University. So, I don't think the universities in Turkey is at this level. So, I'm applying for the PhD positions on abroad. Yes, I don't give up academia yet.

Anu Leinonen: Your current work is in the Kurdish Studies Center, where I have also spent the last four weeks as a guest. Would you like to tell a little more about what is the Kurdish Studies Center and what does it do?

Berfin Coşkun: Yeah, Kurdish Studies Center is a sort of think tank, but the legal status of it is an association based in Diyarbakir. And it aims to produce some qualitative knowledge, some qualitative data from the field about the Kurds. But it's not limited with the Kurds in Turkey, but also in whole region and the other three parts of the Kurdistan as well, and in European diaspora. So yes, we are trying to produce some qualitative knowledge about Kurds in Turkey and the Middle East and in diaspora in Europe.

Anu Leinonen: But so far, the focus has been here in Turkey.

Berfin Coşkun: Yeah.

Anu Leinonen: One of the newer projects at the Kurdish Studies Center is the Kurdish Barometer. And you've just published the findings in a series of reports. Can you tell me a little more about the barometer?

Berfin Coşkun: Of course. Kurdish Barometer is aiming periodically measure the social, cultural, political attitudes of Kurds in the four regions of Kurdistan and in European diaspora, like Eurobarometer or Arab Barometer. I think it's very important... By the way, we only published the Turkey pillar of this project, but we are gonna proceed with the other regions in a further time. So, for example, we are doing the Iraqi Kurdistan in 2024. But I think it's important for the Kurds in Turkey because they are, the Kurds are mostly considered as a homogeneous society, in a political manner. When you said... and it's like they're not, they don't have their rationale and they don't behave according to their own logic and their own emotions. They're just doing what someone tells them to do. But it's not that. They, firstly, they are human, so, they have their social life, they have their cultural values. And I think Kurdish Barometer is important to show how the social and cultural and not only political, but also social, cultural, economic expectation and attitudes of Kurds in Turkey. I hope we are doing this in the other regions as well.

Anu Leinonen: Does anybody else do these survey questionnaires on what Kurds think?

Berfin Coşkun: Not really, not in Turkey. I don't know, maybe some research centres in Europe or maybe even in Turkey, but as I said before, they are only considering Kurds as the political beings. So, most of the surveys on the Kurds is considering their political choices, but they are lacking of their emotions, their expectations and attitudes. I think the Kurdish Barometer is important in that manner too.

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Anu Leinonen: So, in this Kurdish Barometer, you have lots of different sections and questions that concentrate on issues such as identity and language and popular culture and politics. How many people do you interview? Or how many people did you interview? And how were they selected? I mean, who was counted as Kurdish in this barometer?

Berfin Coşkun: Yes. So, the methodology of Kurdish Barometer has a mixed form. We have done some qualitative and quantitative research methods. And for the quantitative side of the methodology of the research, we have interviewed with 1,400 people. I mean, most of those people are defining themselves as Kurds. But we have some measurements

on their Kurdishness. These measurements are involving where they have been born, what's the mother tongue of them and if their parents are communicating with each other in a different language. So, if one of them...

Anu Leinonen: I'm sorry, I didn't understand that. If the parents are communicating in different language, in English? What does that mean, refer to?

Berfin Coşkun: Yes, it's either Kurmanji or Zazaki, if it's Kurdish. So yes, those people with whom we have interviewed are either defining themselves as Kurd, or their parents are speaking in another language, a.k.a. Kurmanji or Zazaki. So yes.

Anu Leinonen: Then a question of identity. You were interviewing people who either consider themselves Kurdish or that their parents have Kurdish language as a mother tongue. But so, how important was this Kurdish identity for the people you interviewed? I mean, is it something that they prioritise?

Berfin Coşkun: Yes, of course. We are in the hundredth years of the republic. So, when we talk about the assimilation and oppression policies that have been going through with the states, we also talk about some resistance and insistence on Kurdishness of the Kurds. So, according to the findings of Kurdish Barometer, in general, we can say that Kurds are owning their Kurdishness, their Kurdish ethnic identity. More than two thirds of Kurds have strong bonds with their Kurdish ethnic identity. And yes, we can say that those bonds, those links with Kurdishness is much stronger with whom also has ability to speak the language. So, the main pillar, the main carrier of the ethnic identity is being able to speak in their mother tongue, the Kurdish language.

Anu Leinonen: This brings us nicely to the next question and the next section in the study, on language. So, in the study, you have a whole section on language because it is also a complicated issue. After a century of Turkish nationalist assimilationist policies, Kurds are or have been Turkified in many ways. And so, according to the barometer, only 30 percent of Kurds or who were defined as Kurds within this barometer are fluent in Kurdish and another 31 percent have, in according to their own estimation, an intermediate level of Kurdish. So, according to the study, for most Kurds in Turkey, Turkish is already the stronger language. Do you think this finding is correct? Or do you think people are just shy of their level of Kurdish? I mean, for example, some older people, they don't know how to read and write in Kurdish. So do you tie this answer to this, or is it actually, has there been such a serious loss of Kurdish language?

Berfin Coşkun: No, I think that finding is partially correct, and it also very much resembles with my own research in my master thesis. But I don't think they are shy about the language. But if we have asked about the literacy in Kurdish, the ratios would have been dramatically decreased too. So yeah, I don't think this decrease is because people being shy. But because I don't think the people are being very shy about their Kurdish identity. The Kurdishness is not something that needs to be hidden anymore. They... yeah?

Anu Leinonen: I don't, being shy about their language skills. I mean, that they don't somehow, they think that their Kurdish is not good enough, even though they actually can speak it.

Berfin Coşkun: No, I don't think so. Yes, I don't think so either. Because in the findings of barometer, you can say the levels of ability to speak in Kurdish. So, I don't think it is because, but also, as I said before, the Kurds are much more openly accepting and owning their own Kurdishness. So, if they could speak in Kurdish, I think they would say it proudly. But yes, Kurds owning their own ethnic identity at the social and political level, I think it's an achievement of those Kurdish politics and bureaucratic fields since the 90s, and also the peace process that we have gone through in between 2013 and 2015. But yes, you're right about the dramatic decrease in the use of Kurdish language, especially among the Kurdish youth. According to the research of Kurdish Studies Center on Kurdish youth, and published in 2020, one of the five young Kurds are not able to speak in Kurdish.

Anu Leinonen: So how many?

Berfin Coşkun: One of five young Kurds cannot speak in Kurdish. And moreover, a large part of who can use the language, do not prefer the Kurdish language as their social communication language.

Anu Leinonen: So, they prefer to speak in Turkish?

Berfin Coşkun: Yes.

Anu Leinonen: I've noticed that here in Diyarbakir, especially at the centre of Diyarbakir, it's mostly Turkish that people speak. But then already, I mean, I went to Kahta during the weekend and when I got on the minibus to go to Siverek, there only the ticket sales were in Turkish, everything else was in Kurdish. So it changes immediately when you go out of the city. Is this the impression of yourself? And does your research have something to say about this?

Berfin Coşkun: I don't think, there is something involved in the research, but I can say from my own perspective as a researcher, Diyarbakir is a very big city. It's one of the biggest with the biggest Kurdish population. And that's why it's like a door opening to the Turkish community at large. So we have a lot of interaction with the Turks in Diyarbakir. That's one thing. But also, Diyarbakir has a symbolic meaning in the Kurdish politics. So that's why, I mean, the Turkish state also aware of it, aware of its importance, that's why they have been practising the assimilation policies on Diyarbakir more than anywhere else. That's why Diyarbakir's social communication language have changed, have switched on to Turkish.

Anu Leinonen: Oh, that's super interesting. So, that maybe the smaller places were left more in peace and then the policies were more strictly enforced here in Diyarbakir.

Berfin Coşkun: Yes, because of political and symbolic meaning of Diyarbakir as a big city.

Anu Leinonen: You grew up in Diyarbakir. How is your Kurdish? I mean, did you learn it from parents or did you have to study it as an adult, as so many people have done here? I've met so many people who said that, well, my Kurdish was quite bad, but then I was 19 and I started taking lessons and now it is good.

Berfin Coşkun: Yes. I'm going to the second option, yes. I have studied, I have started to study in Kurdish when I was in Belgium. So, that's why my literacy is much better than my speaking skills, because I couldn't have any opportunity to practise on. But yes, when my parents were bringing up me and my sister, they were speaking in Turkish at home. So, that's why I had to learn it after, when I got this consciousness about my Kurdishness.

Anu Leinonen: Also according to the Kurdish Barometer, the use of Kurdish is decreasing very fast. There is serious language shift from Kurdish to Turkish, so that over half of the children whose parents are still fluent in Kurdish, don't actually know Kurdish. When taking this into account, how do you see the future of Kurdish?

Berfin Coşkun: It's a wishful thinking that I want to see its future bright. But when you look realistically, it's not that bright, unfortunately. But I can say it from my own research as well. I have interviewed with eight pairs, but only two of them brought up their children as speaking in Kurdish at home. But I can say that the younger generation, the young Kurds who could not speak in Kurdish fluently are very angry with their parents because of not speaking, not bringing up them as speaking Kurdish. That's why they are searching, they're looking for different alternative ways to learn it. And also, I can say that the young generation is speaking up about the language rights more than their parents do. So, even though they could not speak in Kurdish, they are doing its activism, they are doing its advocacy. I think that if it pays return, like it pays turn back to them, yeah, we can see Kurdish future bright. I don't know.

Anu Leinonen: Also, especially when one looks at Kurmanji, one also has to take into account that a dialogue of Kurmanji is used widely in Northern Iraq, in the Kurdish region there, and then it's also used in Syria. So, it's not only the Kurds in Turkey who are speaking Kurmanji. Of course, Zazaki is a smaller language. So, Zazaki is considered a threatened language because of the language shift here in Turkey. Do you see that the fact that there is state television and radio in Kurdish, so TRT Kurdi, and Kurdish is being taught at the university level, so, there are programs of Kurdish language and literature, and then Kurdish can also be taken as an elective class in the middle school. Do you think these have any effect on the situation of Kurdish?

Berfin Coşkun: Yes, I'm hearing what you have counted the three things, the three facts, and I consider them as an achievement. But these were made with a political aim, with a political purpose. Not only, I mean, the state gave those things to Kurds, not because it's their right, and this is the right thing to do, but it had a political aim while doing it. So, that's why it was already... They were already born with a political aim, with a political purpose. So, that's why it's very engaged with the political atmosphere of Turkey. When you look past, and I remember that the Kurdish language faculties and the departments were opened at the university level, but after the peace process has been frozen and then done, most of them were closed. And even in those faculties, the lectures are started to be given in Turkish. It's very linked to the political atmosphere and how the state takes position in the Kurdish issue. I think, yes, of course, it started to raise an awareness towards the Kurdish language, but Kurds, especially in Kurdistan, have an ideological opposition to those things. For example, they don't watch the TRT Kurdi, only the elder ones, for example, my grandmother, but she does not do it on a political purpose, but she just likes what's being shown on the TV, and also, the state is speaking Kurdish, makes them proud of their Kurdishness. But when you come to, for example, middle age or the young Kurds, they have this ideological opposition to watch and, like, enrolling those university departments.

Anu Leinonen: So, you think that they remain on the symbolic level and are not useful at all, and also that there is strong opposition to them?

Berfin Coşkun: Yes, yes, I think so. Especially against the TRT Kurdi, because they think that it's making propaganda of the states and this is not, Kurdish is being used as a tool, as a political tool to them. So, they have this ideological opposition to watch it.

[Music]

Anu Leinonen: We've discussed issues of identity and language, but what are the main political demands of Kurdish population in Turkey? So, the idea for a long time has been that Kurds are demanding independence, that the Kurds want to find a Kurdish nation state. But as far as I know, this is not true any longer and has not been for a long time. But according to your survey, what do the Kurds want? What do the Kurds demand?

Berfin Coşkun: Yes, I don't know, an united and independent Kurdish state, I think still lies down in every Kurd's heart. But from a realistic perspective, it doesn't have any stage to do. The political demands of Kurds are mostly based on equal citizenship. So, as the findings of Kurdish Barometer shows, the first demand of Kurds, according to the findings of Kurdish Barometer, is based on the mother tongue, like, receiving education in mother tongue, having Kurdish language as an official status, having the state practices, state activities...

Anu Leinonen: Public services.

Berfin Coşkun: Having the public services in their own language. These are the main demands. But also, the whole history of Kurdish issue in Turkey is based on recognition. They are seeking for a recognition, and on the basis of equal citizenship.

Anu Leinonen: But so, the very complex history and the present situation and politics in this region are quite often labelled as a Kurdish issue, a Kurdish question, or even a Kurdish problem. So, according to your survey study, do Kurds think that there is a Kurdish issue? And what do they think are the reasons for it, if there is such an issue?

Berfin Coşkun: According to the findings of Kurdish Barometer, more than half of the Kurds that we have interviewed thinks that there is a Kurdish issue in Turkey. So, two thirds of Kurds consider it, the Kurdish issue as an important problem.

Anu Leinonen: So what has caused it? What are the root causes of this Kurdish issue in the opinion of the Kurds?

Berfin Coşkun: As it's a multi-layered issue, the Kurds have faced mostly the discriminatory practices from the state. Kurds do not think that they are treated as equal citizens because their right to choose, right to elections, are being violated. They cannot receive their education in their languages and their identity is being criminalized. So, they are seeking for an equal citizenship in Turkey. And most of the causes of Kurdish issue is based on social, political, economic, and cultural discriminatory actions against from the state.

Anu Leinonen: Whom do the Kurds normally vote for? So, politics.

Berfin Coşkun: Until very recent time, the Kurdish region has had more like a bipolar political base. They were either voting for the AKP, the ruling party run by President Erdoğan, or they were supporting HDP, which means People's Equality and Democracy Party. This party is coming from a political tradition, which consistently demanding for Kurdish rights and mostly ideologically affiliated with the PKK. So, this bipolar political structure of the region has been slightly broken with the latest development. Because the Kurdish community in Turkey has been going through some deep sociological changes such as urbanization, getting engaged with more Turkish education, getting more middle class and everything. They have changed their political choices on the field as well. For example, the last political results show that both AKP and HDP has decreased their voters, their supporters in the region. However, we have observed the slight increase in the votes of CHP, which is the main opposition party, which means that Kurds are looking for some alternative way of doing politics within the legitimate borders of the political area. So, yes, until very recent time, it was a bipolar political structure in the region. But now, we are observing a slight change in it.

Anu Leinonen: In the West, Kurds are often spoken of as the biggest nation in the world without their own state. What is your idea on this Kurdish unity? I mean, according to the barometer, over 40 percent of the participants either do not follow what's happening in Iraqi Kurdistan or in Syria, or they don't want to discuss this. Do you find this surprising?

Berfin Coşkun: Actually no. Firstly, we can say the political opposition and the struggle that Turkey is giving in Syria and the not, I don't know, not bright relation with the Iraqi Kurdistan, they may feel hesitated to talk about it. But when, even we don't count on it, the findings are not surprising to me, because as I said before, the Kurdish unity is lying down in every Kurd's heart, but it's not realistic. So, they have much more common problems, they have much more common world view with someone who is ethnically Turk than someone in Syria or Iraqi Kurdistan. They are experiencing much similar life and much similar social and political problems in Turkey than the Kurds in Iraq or Syria. But that's why I don't find this finding surprising, but personally, I have some connections with the Iraqi and Syrian Kurdistan. And also, because of my personal interest and because of my work, I personally follow the events across the border.

Anu Leinonen: Another project you have ongoing in the Kurdish Studies Center is the Bulletin of Inequality. In this project, you don't collect the data yourselves, but you use the data of the Turkish Statistical Institute. You compare the provinces with large Kurdish population to the rest of the provinces in Turkey. What kind of examples on inequality based on this work you can give?

Berfin Coşkun: Yes, first, I want to explain why we are doing this with the Turkish state's data. We are experiencing and we are living in that inequality, and as a Kurdish Studies Center, when you put the Kurds into the research, we are already aware of the inequality and our research show the inequality that this region where the Kurdish population mostly dwell in has some unequal treatments and practices in daily life. But when it is also shown in the official data of Turkey state, it has some legitimacy, because this data set we are using while doing the Bulletin of Inequality is not explicitly saying that this region has some inequalities because of they are Kurds. But we are coming up with the results that mostly, where the Kurdish people are living has some inequalities in 15 categories that Turkey state has in these data sets. So, I can give the examples of, of course, on the education. Yes, with the latest PISA results, Turkey do not have a bright educational situation right now. But it's even worse in the region, because the children in the region who do not receive the education in their mother tongue lack one half years when compared to their contemporary, the other children.

[Music]

Anu Leinonen: It's been very important for me and interesting to be here in the centre and get to know more about what you do, and I find your research also very important. However, most of it is in Turkish, which I can read, but most of our followers, I mean, the followers of this podcast cannot read your reports because they are not published in English. Why is that? Is it because you don't have the resources to publish also in English? Or is it that you are mainly addressing the audience in Turkey, that you're really targeting people in Turkey with your research?

Berfin Coşkun: Actually, it's mostly because of the lack of the resources, because the translation has a big cost for such a small research organization. But yes, that's also true that we are mainly targeting the audience in Turkey because we want them to understand what Kurds think and how they live. Also, I think it's important to spread as much, as more place as possible, to the knowledge that we have produced. That's why I think English is a way to doing it. And also, I think as a Kurdish study centre, which main focus is on Kurds, should have some resources in Kurdish as well. Not because it has a value, it should be read in Kurdish as well, but also it has symbolic meaning that producing the Kurdish knowledge in Kurdish language. I think that's not something we are doing intentionally, but because of the necessity and yes, obligations.

Anu Leinonen: Before we finish this interview, I want to get back to more personal issues. You're yourself from Diyarbakir. Is Diyarbakir your favourite place in Turkey's Kurdistan or is somewhere else nicer? What is your favourite place?

Berfin Coşkun: Yes, I am a bit conservative about Diyarbakir. I love the city and I have this special personal bond. But yes, and that would be my answer that Diyarbakir is my favourite place in Kurdistan in Turkey.

Anu Leinonen: For you, as a young urban Kurdish person, what is best in Kurdish culture? I mean, is it the music, the dances, what do you like the best?

Berfin Coşkun: I love every cultural items that Kurds has. I love Kurdish music. As the Kurdish Barometer also shows that music is a part of our identity. I mean, we are defining ourselves with our literature and music and the way of dressing. So, yeah, I love Kurdish music, and it's getting much more varied in every music genre. So, I love every of them. But I am an average Kurd. So, as the barometer showed, my favourite singer is Mem Ararat, too. It was the same in the Kurdish Barometer results as well. And also, I personally like Rewşan Çeliker.

Anu Leinonen: Can you say those two names very clearly and slowly for the listeners?

Berfin Coşkun: Of course. The first one is Mem Ararat. It's also most listened Kurdish singer among Kurds, as well, as the Kurdish Barometer shows.

Anu Leinonen: So Mem Ararat.

Berfin Coşkun: Mem Ararat, yes. And the other one is Rewşan Çeliker. Rewşan is... okay.

Anu Leinonen: Rewşan Çeliker.

Berfin Coşkun: Yes. And I mean, her Kurdish is very pure so that I can understand. That's why I love her music too. And also, for literature, I have a special bond with Mehmed Uzun's books. It's my first encounter with the Kurdish identity in literature. So, it has a very special place for me.

Anu Leinonen: How about good Kurdish films? Can you recommend something that would really tell something essential?

Berfin Coşkun: Yes. I mean, we have been talking a lot about the language. I mean, the importance of language and the oppression that Kurdish language has been facing. So, I would recommend a movie on being caught in the middle of two languages. It's *Di Navberê De*. Means that in between in Kurdish. So it's a story about a mechanic in Diyarbakir who has a neurologic disease that he understands but couldn't talk Kurdish while he's able to speak in Turkish but do not understand Turkish. So, yes, it's very nice. It's a tragicomic story and it's very short movie.

Anu Leinonen: Can you say the name again?

Berfin Coşkun: *Di Navberê De*. In English, it's *In between*.

Anu Leinonen: Okay. Thank you for visiting the Middle East Now podcast, Berfin Coşkun.

Berfin Coşkun: I thank you for visiting us in Diyarbakir and having me in your podcast.

Anu Leinonen: You listened to the Lähi-Itä Nyt podcast brought to you by the Finnish Institute in the Middle East. You can find the podcast at Lahi-Itanyt.fi or Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

[Music]